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Major concerns have recently arisen in Europe and in the United States about the 
behaviour of their housing markets. Surging prices seem to be far removed from 
their fundamental value, arousing bad memories of the time when the equity 
bubble burst. Valuable contributions have been made about the phenomenon but 
few have addressed the finance side of the housing bubble and its potential 
consequences on household balance sheets. 
 
 
What is so special about the housing market? 
 
In housing markets, nominal price trends are mainly upward and are consequently 
highly persistent. This can be explained by the fact that houses are both consumer 
and investment goods. Hence, when the market is weaker, it is rarely prices that 
decline but mainly the volumes of houses sold that do. 
On the supply side, the housing market differentiates itself from other markets 
through its short-term inelasticity – i.e. it is takes a long time to expand the 
housing supply. This characteristic makes any adjustment of the housing market 
mostly demand-driven and strengthens the argument for controlled funding
2 to the 
sector. 
 
From graph 1, a surge in house prices above the trend can be observed over the 
past five years. This could amount to a bubble on both the American and European 
housing markets. The ‘non-bubble’ explanation would be that people are 
anticipating either lower interest rates or robust income growth. Given that 
expectations are currently heading in the opposite direction - i.e. monetary 
tightening and weak growth forecasts for EU economies - the ‘non-bubble’ 
explanation of house price trends is unsustainable. 
 
 
                                                 
1 ECMI Research Assistant. 
2 As adjustments are mainly demand driven, the mortgage funding of housing should be accurate, in the 
sense that the risk has to be evaluated precisely and with even greater attention.  
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Graph 1: Housing prices index - a transatlantic perspective 
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Source: OECD. 
 
 
Eurozone house price dynamics 
 
Since European Monetary Integration, interest rates have fallen to their lowest levels 
(see graph 2). This phenomenon, combined with the current ‘liquidity overhang’ on 
capital markets, laid the foundations for the housing boom. In fact, the low level of key 
ECB interest rates has trickled down and exerted downward pressure on the rate for new 
loans to households for house purchases (see graph 3). 
 
Graph 2: Key ECB interest rates 
Key ECB interest rates
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Source: www.ecb.int.  
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Graph 3: Interest rate granted to households in the eurozone 
 
Source: www.ecb.int. 
 
Both effects have been reflected in interest rates for mortgages and pushed them to 
historically low levels. Consequently, the cost of housing capital fell below average and 
mortgage credit demand surged.  
 
Excessive money supply in the eurozone resulting from the combination of the two above 
mentioned factors is the most relevant factor in residential mortgage dynamics. Indeed 
there might be scope for further ‘credit deepening’ in the eurozone economy, but current 
dynamics seem too abnormal to consider such movement as a deeply rooted structural 
trend. As graph 4 emphasises, loans to households for house purchases (dotted line) 
have increased considerably over the past year and a half and credit standards have 
been declining (bars). The data gathered for graph 4 is based largely on a bank lending 
survey done by the European Central Bank and is not exhaustive, but gives a good 
overall picture of credit standards in Europe.  
 
Graph 4: Bank credit standards and loans for house purchases 
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All conclusions from the above graphs point in the same direction - bad risk evaluation 
and widespread debt accumulation by households. 
 
 
A problem for countries such as Ireland, Spain & Portugal 
 
According to the OECD
3, the situation is less straightforward and housing overvaluation is 
far from being a general phenomenon in the eurozone. Current concerns about the 
housing market vary from country to country but the following pattern is emerging - 
Anglo-Saxon countries which heavily rely on debt financing show high residential 
mortgages relative to their GDPs, followed by continental European economies and finally 
by accession countries. 
 
Graph 5: Residential Debt to GDP in the eurozone 
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Source: European Mortgage Federation
 
 
Comparing the amount of mortgage financing relative to GDP sheds light on potential 
imbalances in the housing sector if financial stress occurs. Latin countries (especially 
Portugal and Spain) seem to be more affected than Anglo-Saxon countries. In fact, they 
rely heavily on mortgage finance (as much as Anglo-Saxon economies) although they are 
traditionally less financially developed economies than Anglo-Saxon ones.  
 
On the one hand, the Portuguese mortgage debt market has been expanding slowly in 
2004, so concerns do not seem to be justified. By contrast, the Spanish market has 
continued its buoyant growth despite the fact that its share of mortgage debt relative to 
GDP is already high. The combination of heavy reliance on debt financing and surging 
prices (149% between 1997 and 2004) suggests exuberance in the Spanish housing 
market.  
 
The growth rate of mortgage debt in Austria and Greece could also raise concern that it is 
unsustainable. But their residential debt to GDP ratios reveal that they are seeing more 
and more of their citizens take a step onto the property ladder (as both have low per 
capita mortgage debt) and that there is no imbalance.  
                                                 
3 OECD working paper No 475, 2006  
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A more worrying trend can be observed in the Irish mortgage market. House prices have 
surged by 187% and mortgage debt has grown by 29.8% over the last year (cf. table1). 
Comparing this figure to GDP points to the sustainability of the trend, but a glance at the 
per capita figure raises doubts about its sustainability. A residential mortgage level close 
to that of Luxembourg has been reached although Ireland’s GDP per capita remains far 
below that of Luxembourg.  
 
Finally, house prices in France and Italy have been buoyant as well (around 70% 
growth), but the finance side continues to be less of a concern than on the Irish or 
Spanish markets. As can be seen in table 1, per capita mortgage debt is in fact far from 
its potential value and is thus presumably sustainable. 
 
 
Table 1: The mortgage arithmetic of the eurozone 
 
Value of mortgage debt, 
million € 
Growth in mortgage debt 
(year on year change) 
Residential Debt to 
GDP
4 
Per capita 
Mortgage Debt 
Belgium  88,434 8.2%  31.2%  8,506 
Denmark  174,300 6.0%  89.7%  32,292 
Germany  1,157,026 0.1%  52.4%  14,019 
Greece  34,052 28.3%  20.6%  3,084 
Spain  384,631 22.9%  45.9%  9,083 
France  432,300 12.2%  26.2%  7,217 
Ireland  77,029 29.8%  52.7%  19,125 
Italy  196,504 13.4%  14.5%  3,395 
Luxembourg  8,797 12.3%  34.3%  19,480 
Netherlands  518,115 14.3%  111.1%  31,868 
Austria  48,064 20.9%  20.3%  5,905 
Portugal  70,834 6.9%  52.5%  6,762 
Finland  56,522 10.8%  37.8%  10,829 
Sweden  147,163 10.0%  52.7%  16,396 
UK  1,243,261 11.1%  72.5%  20,835 
EU 15  4,566,198 9.6%  46.4%  11,931 
EU 25  4,670,736 9.7%  45.3%  10,223 
United States  7,568,200 13.8%  64.5%  25,772 
Source: European Mortgage Federation    
 
 
How the financial side of the story will pan out for households 
 
Reassuringly, a sudden correction on the scale of a financial market bubble bursting is a 
highly unlikely scenario in the housing market due to its short term inelasticity and the 
special nature of a housing good. Instead, the volume of houses sold can be expected to 
remain static until the fundamental value of houses is more in line with current prices. 
 
In such a case of exuberance in a particular market, the focus should be placed on the 
finance side of the story, especially given past trends in risk allocation. The emergence of 
mortgage-backed securities has enabled banks to shift risks from their balance sheets 
onto those of homeowners over the past ten years. Considering that mortgage-financed 
housing is more widespread among households than equity products, the consequences 
of a housing price slowdown will affect a wider share of households. The very nature of 
the housing market finance has contributed to generating the bubble.  
 
                                                 
4 Residential debt: Loans given to individuals for housing purposes.  
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House prices are led by the banks’ incentive to lend as much as possible when property 
prices are rising due to the positive effect on the value of their collateral. Consequently, 
prices are pushed upwards in times of house price rises. In times of economic slowdown, 
banks pull out of the business, potentially amplifying the disrupting effect of exuberance 
on the housing market. Such behaviour by the banking sector makes it harder for 
households to keep up with the interest payments on their mortgages. It thus deepens 
boom and bust cycles, especially where variable rate mortgages have been taken up. 
Furthermore, refinancing mortgages through asset-backed securities amplifies contagion 
from household to household and from country to country.  
 
In addition, banks considerably gain in standing due to their mortgage activity. Spanish 
banks have played a major role in making Spain the European country with the highest 
rate of home ownership in Europe.
5 Considering that the current tensions on the Spanish 
housing market are based largely on credit expansion and on an ‘interest rate mismatch’
6 
at the Spanish national level, they are even more worrying. A potential decline in this 
national market may well have deep consequences at the household level, particularly on 
consumption and investment prospects. 
 
Weakening housing markets may soon start to weigh on consumer spending as the 
experiences from Britain and Australia suggest. In continental Europe, the consequences 
can be expected to be less pronounced as numerous papers have emphasised the fact 
that continental Europe economies are less responsive to house prices than their Anglo-
Saxon counterparts. The new ways in which housing is financed has shifted financial risk 
from banks to homeowners. In particular those who have opted for a variable rate 
mortgage could be severely affected by a collapse in housing prices.  
 
Whether an active policy is needed to tackle pressure on housing markets is doubtful in 
the current environment of yield curve flattening. The EU’s long term interest rate is 
currently not responsive to short term interest rates. Furthermore, interest rates in 
continental Europe are a less effective tool for propping up demand than in Anglo-Saxon 
economies. In the latter economies, interest rates tend to affect the economy through 
the housing market, which is not the case with continental economies as they rely more 
on fixed-rate mortgages. Furthermore the eurozone’s fragmented mortgage market 
dampens the effect of the EU interest rate on national mortgage markets. Thus monetary 
tightening might not tame the credit/mortgage-led housing bubble in EU countries. 
 
Placing the current housing bubble in a longer term context is cause for greater concern. 
It seems that we are currently jumping from one bubble to another. The equity market 
bubble, the bond market conundrum and the current house price bubble strongly 
suggests that the excess liquidity problem might have been wrongly addressed in 
previous years and that the bubble is just being pushed from market to market… 
suggesting high integration and accordingly even more disruptive effects. 
 
The corollary is that, according to The Economist, the total value of residential property 
in developed economies has doubled over the past five years to reach an equivalent of 
100% of those countries’ combined GDPs. This dwarves any previous house market 
bubble as well as the dotcom stock market bubble of the late 1990s. To some observers 
it is the biggest bubble in history and in the current macroeconomic context it is highly 
doubtful if interest rate hikes will suffice to tame it. 
                                                 
5 The Economist, “Corporate conquistadors”, 16 February 2006  
6 The term “Interest mismatch” is here used in the sense that the ECB’s rate takes the average economic 
stance of the euro zone into account. Hence the interest rate of the Euro zone seems currently misaligned with 
the interest rate that a country experiencing a credit deepening (like Spain or Ireland) should have.  